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RACE DISCOURSE AND PROPOSITION 187
John SW Park*
California voters approved Proposition 187 in November 1994. This
measure denies public education and all non-emergency care to undoc-
umented aliens. The provision also requires citizens to report those sus-
pected of being undocumented aliens to the Immigration Naturalization
Service. This Note discusses the fact that proponents and opponents of
Proposition 187, including those using a civil rights discourse, spoke of
undocumented aliens as objects or assets to be used or removed, and not
as persons with basic human rights. Only citizens were considered as
having constitutional protection of their rights. This Note argues that
human rights and civil rights advocates must go beyond the use of con-
temporary civil rights discourse to a discourse of basic human rights, in
order to treat all persons as human beings, deserving of protection of
certain basic rights irrespective of their citizenship status.
INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 1994, a majority of California voters approved
Proposition 187.' Under the more controversial provisions of the
new law, the estimated 1.6 million undocumented aliens in
California are denied public education and all non-emergency
medical care.2 In addition, all social service and health care facilities
are required to report to the state Attorney General and to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) those "suspected of
being present in the United States in violation of federal im-
migration laws.",3 Presumably, the INS would then initiate
deportation proceedings for those found to be present illegally.4 Not
surprisingly, Proposition 187 inspired a visceral public discourse.
* B.A. 1991, University of California at Berkeley; Master of Public Policy 1993,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Ph.D. candidate, Juris-
prudence and Social Policy expected 1997, University of California at Berkeley
School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Angela Harris, Professor Marianne
Constable, and Professor Jeremy Waldron. This Note is dedicated to my Mother,
Edward Park, Reiko Furuta, and Gowan Lee.
1. See Daniel Weintraub, Crime, Immigration Help Wilson, Poll Finds, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1994, at Al.
2. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(c)(3) (West 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 10001.5(c)(3) (West 1996).
3. § 130(c)(3); § 10001.5(c)(3).
4. § 130(c)(3); § 10001.5(c)(3).
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Proponents and opponents of the measure discussed several themes
important to contemporary political theory, particularly themes
related to sovereignty and civil rights.
This Note shows how participants in that debate-including
people of color-spoke of "rights" in a way that denied the possibil-
ity for undocumented aliens to have rights. When citizens spoke,
they did so in a way that implicitly linked rights to citizenship; in
other words, they assumed that without citizenship, persons were
not entitled to rights or rights-based claims. Ironically, the debate
about Proposition 187 pointed to the achievements of a "civil rights"
vision, even as that debate reduced undocumented aliens to "non-
persons," without rights and without a legitimate place in society.
California citizens talked, instead, about how useless or useful un-
documented aliens were and about how society should best manage
them as a resource. The debate raised serious questions about the
limits of a civil rights discourse, and about its potential to divide
people of color against themselves.
This Note is divided into three parts: Part I outlines the argu-
ments for and against Proposition 187 as they appeared in the
media; Part II discusses the more recent history of "civil rights talk,"
and how citizens, conspired to treat persons without citizenship as
persons without rights. This Part also explores the disturbing impli-
cations of these developments. Part III suggests ways to rephrase
this rights discourse, so that rights may be viewed independent of
sovereignty.
I. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PROPOSITION 187
A. Arguments for Proposition 187
In the early months of 1994, Governor Pete Wilson prepared a
series of lawsuits against the federal government to obtain reim-
bursement for "educating illegal immigrants in California public
schools," and "for the cost of providing health services and incarcer-
ating undocumented immigrants."' In speeches that helped shape
the debate around Proposition 187, Wilson argued that California
was forced to pay for the "net cost" of undocumented aliens-which
he estimated at some $2.3 billion per year-because the federal gov-
ernment failed to secure the nation's borders.6 Wilson demanded $10
5. Robert B. Gunnison, Wilson Sues Again on Immigration, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23,
1994, at A23.
6. See Illegal Immigrants, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1994, at 35; Robert B. Jackson, Think
Tank Supports Wilson on Immigrant Cost, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1994, at A4; Nancy
Gibbs, Keep Out, You Tired, You Poor. . . , TIME, Oct., 3, 1994, at 46; Gunnison, supra
note 5, at A23. See generally MILTON MORRIS & ALBERT MAYIO, CURBING ILLEGAL
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billion from federal government to defend against "an invasion...
[a] massive and unlawful migration of foreign nationals," many of
whom arrived in California sFecifically to take advantage of social
services and public education.
When Wilson came out in support of Proposition 187, he
claimed that even if undocumented aliens did not come to benefit
from state programs, the provision of services to undocumented ali-
ens constituted a significant cost to legal residents of California. In
either case, by cutting benefits to undocumented aliens, Californians
could eliminate an incentive to migrate, and retrieve scarce re-
sources at a time when the state was fiscally vulnerable.' In a speech
in Orange County, Governor Wilson said: "We are unable to provide
services to our own legal residents. . .. Now that is terribly unfair,
and I say we should end those services to illegal immigrants. We are
rewarding people for violating US law."9
IMMIGRATION (1982); FRANCISCO RIVERA-BATIZ ET AL., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
REFORM IN THE 1980s (1991) (discussing findings that although social science research
on illegal immigrants generally suffers from the fact that illegals are hard to study as
a population, most studies show that illegals either benefit the economy as a whole
by contributing cheap labor, or if they do drain the economy, that they do so negli-
gibly).
7. See Gunnison, supra note 5, at A23; see also Barry Edmonston et al., Perceptions
and Estimates of Undocumented Migration to the United States, in UNDOCUMENTED
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 27 (Frank D. Bean et al. eds., 1990) (conveying the
results of a joint Rand Corporation-Urban Institute study that shows a recent de-
crease in the number of illegal immigrants to the United States); Frank Bean et al.,
Post-IRCA Changes in the Volume and Composition of Undocumented Migration to the
United States, in UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 153
(noting that although the Rand Corporation-Urban Institute study shows an overall
decrease in illegal immigration, the number of illegal border crossings by women,
children and non-Mexicans appears to be increasing).
8. See Louis Freedberg, Wilson Defends Stance on Illegals, S.F. CHRON., June 23,
1994, at A2; Julie Marquis, Wilson Blames Ills on Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17,
1994, at B1; see also Indecent Proposition in California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1994, at A20
(noting that although some supporters of Proposition 187 acknowledged that some
undocumented aliens migrate to benefit from public services, the primary pull for
undocumented aliens is the hope for employment); ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT
JUSTICE FOR ALL 112 (1985) (stating that the primary pull for undocumented aliens is
the hope for employment); Linda Bozniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Iden-
tity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 988
(stating that "the overwhelming majority of undocumented immigrants come to this
country to work"); Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to Equality,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1026, 1038 (1994) (stating that the dominant cause of illegal immi-
gration is the hope of obtaining employment); Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Turns
Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al (stating that jobs
are "widely considered by scholars and other authorities to be the principal lure for
immigrants").
9. Marquis, supra note 8, at B1. See also Brown, Wilson Clash on Crime, Immigration,
Taxes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1994, at Al; Gebe Martinez, Illegal Immigrants' Tab for
Emergency Care: $61 Million, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at B7.
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Many also feared that undocumented workers would take jobs
from legal residents.' ° Although some economists agreed that un-
documented aliens do not compete with legal residents in the labor
market, and even though some organized proponents of the meas-
ure did not argue to that effect, proponents often cited the fear of
competition for jobs in supporting Proposition 187." Among people
of color, the resentment toward undocumented immigrants was es-
pecially acute. Kevin Ross, an Inglewood deputy district attorney
and political action chairman of the NAACP chapter in Los Angeles,
noted that "[florty percent of African American youth are unem-
ployed. When the assertion is made that illegal immigrants do the
jobs others wouldn't do in the first place, the black community is
offended.' 2
For some supporters of Proposition 187, the issue of whether
undocumented immigrants use or take resources seemed irrelevant.
Many simply saw the issue as one of law enforcement, or lack
thereof. The very presence of undocumented aliens indicated the
failure of government to control borders. For example, Michael
Huffington, a California Republican candidate for United States
Senate, supported Proposition 187 because it was "time to send a
message to illegal immigrants who disregard our laws." Huffington
called the initiative a "first step toward finally enforcing our immi-
gration laws."'3 Building upon these themes, proponents of
Proposition 187 described how the measure would be used as a tool
to regain control over the system. 4 Citizens responded to that argu-
ment; a Mexican American woman in Los Angeles said, "I'm against
all those girls coming over here [to have children] so they can get a
check, free [food] stamps, medical and everything."'5 Another Mexi-
can American woman resented the fact that there were cars bearing
Mexican license plates at her community college.'
6
Proponents claimed that some of the unfairness could be traced
to the federal government, which caused the problem through lax
enforcement of immigration laws, court decisions that mandated
state spending on undocumented aliens, and general neglect of
10. See Karen Brandon, Illegal Immigration: A Drain or an Asset?, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18,
1994, at 14.
11. Evelyn C. White, Immigration a Tough Call for Blacks: Proposition 187 Debate Has
Stirred Deep Feelings, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 1994, at Al.
12. See id.
13. John Wildermuth, Huffington Endorses Proposition 187, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21,
1994, at A3.
14. See Rich Connell, Proposition 187's Support Shows No Boundaries, L.A. TIMES,





California's illegal alien problems. 7 Whatever the merits of
Proposition 187 proponents agreed that a vote in favor of it would
"send a message that even the White House will understand."'8
Thus, Proposition 187 was an occasion for the electorate to "send a
visceral 'we're fed up' message to the [federal] government about
the need to tighten both the border and the public's spending on
undocumented immigrants."'9 Ultimately, though some proponents
saw Proposition 187 as divisive, contrary to federal statutes, and
flatly unconstitutional, they favored the measure solely because it
was "California's wake-up call." 20 Commentators like George Will
took the measure's unconstitutionality as a major strength:
Proposition 187 would "force the Supreme Court to rethink" Plyler v.
Doe,' under which public school districts were not allowed to deny
undocumented children a public education.2
Finally, proponents spoke of Proposition 187 as though it were
a vent for deep-seated hostility toward undocumented aliens and
their foreign cultures.2n This was apparent in the responses to the
mass demonstration held in opposition to Proposition 187 in Los
Angeles three weeks before the election. The display of foreign flags,
the speeches delivered in Spanish, and the enormous size of the
crowd made some feel that "American values are being overrun by
an uncontrolled influx of Third World citizens ... .,,24 "[T]o propo-
nents of Proposition 187... the march was an outrageous display of
Mexican nationalism that bolsters the case for reducing immigration.
'Any time they're flying Mexican flags, it helps us.' "2 However,
with almost sixty percent of voters supporting the measure on elec-
tion day, Proposition 187 did not need much help.
B. Arguments Against Proposition 187
Proposition 187 engendered what appeared to be a formidable
opposition. Major newspapers, including The Los Angeles Times, The
San Francisco Chronicle, The Christian Science Monitor, The Chicago
17. Proposition 187, CAL. J. WKLY., Sept. 26, 1994.
18. Harold Ezell, Enough Is More Than Enough, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at M5.
19. See Brad Hayward, Foes Sharpen Strategies on Immigration Measure,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 4, 1994, at Al.
20. Proposition 187, supra note 17.
21. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
22. See George Will, Reclaiming the Right of Self-Determination, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
1994, at C7.
23. See Alicia Doyle & Antonio Olivo, Proposition 187 s Impact on Race Relations,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at B2.
24. See id.
25. Patrick J. McDonnell & Robert J Lopez, Some See New Activism in Huge March,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1994, at B1 (quoting Alan Nelson, co-author of Proposition 187).
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Tribune, and The New York Times, published editorials against it. 21
Two groups, Taxpayers Against Proposition 187 and Californians
United Against Proposition 187, emerged and organized grass-roots
opposition to the measure.27 Both groups obtained support from a
long list of organizations, including the California Medical Associa-
tion, the League of Women Voters and the California Catholic
Conference. 28 Although early on in the debate opponents conceded
that illegal immigration was a problem for California, they nonethe-
less opposed the measure primarily on policy grounds, because "the
measure is a poorly drafted solution to the problem" and because "it
will neither save money nor stop illegal immigration but will intro-
duce other problems that will affect everybody, not just
undocumented immigrants."29
Opponents said the Proposition would be ineffective. They em-
phasized that the initiative would not stop illegal aliens from either
coming to California or voluntarily leaving. Economist Deborah
Cobb-Clark said, "If you compare the opportunities in the United
States and the opportunities in their home countries, the U.S. is still
going to be a better deal."' 3 And "no matter how harsh benefit poli-
cies become, the lure of California's jobs and wages are likely to
keep attracting Mexicans, Central Americans, and others over the
border and keep most of the 1.5 million illegal aliens now estimated
to be in the state from voluntarily returning home."3'
Opponents claimed that Proposition 187 would not reduce Cali-
fornia's immediate financial burdens for two reasons: (1) it would be
too costly to implement and (2) it would jeopardize federal money
slated for California. The Legislative Analysts Office estimated
"hidden" administrative costs of up to $100 million in the first year
alone because Proposition 187 required virtually all local agencies to
somehow discover and report undocumented aliens.32 Editorials
warned that the measure would create "considerable administrative
26. SOS Initiative-Costly, Mean and Wrong, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 16, 1994, at Sunday
Punch 1; Karen Brandon, Illegal Immigration: A Drain or an Asset?, CI. TRIB., Oct. 18,
1994, at 1; Why Californians Should Vote 'No' on Proposition 187, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1994, at B6; Punishing Immigrants, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1994, at 18; Inde-
cent Proposition in California, supra note 8, at A20.
27. See Hayward, supra note 19, at Al.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Stuart Silverstein, Domestics: Hiring the Illegal Hits Home, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28,
1994, at Al; see also Developments in the Law--Im migration Policy and the Rights of Ali-
ens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1436-37 (1983) (reviewing statistics on undocumented
aliens and finding that they "accept wages and working conditions that are below
the acceptable minimums established by United States law but vastly superior to
what is available in their home countries").
31. Indecent Proposition in California, supra note 8, at A20.
32. See SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET 92 (1994).
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disarray," and that it "would add to the state's already nightmarish
bureaucracy."' ' Because at least one aspect of Proposition 187 was
unconstitutional, and because its reporting requirements constituted
a prima facie violation of federal law, opponents warned that Cali-
fornia schools would lose federal money if it passed 4 President
Clinton's Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, predicted that "[Proposition
187] will produce chaos. School districts [and hospitals] will not
know how much they will receive from the federal government. 35
Critics warned of additional, long-term costs. For example,
Howard Chang, an Asian American law professor at the University
of Southern California, wrote: "[Proposition 187] would create an
underclass of illiterate and impoverished residents . . . that would
create new risks to public health and new breeding grounds for
crime, and thereby threaten the welfare of all Californians., 36 On the
issue of health care, for instance, the California Medical Association
predicted that "undocumented patients with tuberculosis would
tend to delay seeking care for more than two months, infecting an
average of ten people each. 37
On the educational front, Robert Dornan, a former congressman
from Orange County, California, and a firm supporter of Proposition
187, expressed some concern about the effect of the law on undocu-
mented children. Noting that "idle hands are the devil's workshop"
he asked, "What do you accomplish by putting kids on the street
where they can get into mischief? 38 One politically progressive
group warned that
the damage to innocent children will be incalculable in its
profound harm to them and to this state's economic and
social future .... Without public education for immigrant
33. Why Californians Should Vote 'No' on Proposition 187, supra note 26, at B6; SOS
Initiative-Costly, Mean and Wrong, supra note 26, at Sunday Punch 1.
34. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(g) (West 1996); Louis Freedberg, Immigration Measure Would
Cost Schools, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 1994, at Al.
35. Marc Sandalow & Louis Freedberg, Panetta Warns State of Prop. 187 'Chaos,'
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27, 1994, at A2.
36. Howard F. Chang, Shame on Them, Picking on Children, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1994, at B5; see Plyler, 457 U.S. at 241 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[I]t can be hardly ar-
gued rationally that anyone benefits from the creation within our borders of a
subclass of illiterate persons many of whom will remain in the State, adding to the
problems and costs of both State and National Governments attendant upon unem-
ployment, welfare, and crime.").
37. Pamela Burdman, Many Doctors Would Ignore Prop. 187, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19,
1994, at A2. But see Hayward, supra note 19, at Al (countering that "Proposition 187's
reduction in the undocumented population of our state should itself reduce the
state's tuberculosis rate").
38. Gebe Martinez, Kemp Draws Criticism for Voicing Opposition, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1994, at B1.
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children and adults, high rates of illiteracy in English will
prevent their full participation in the community and fuller
participation in the work force.3
Opponents further suggested that even if undocumented aliens
could be eliminated from American society, the goal would be un-
desirable because it would entail the loss of a politically and
economically important group. Politically, Latinos represent the
fastest growing group of voters in California.4° Recalling how Re-
publicans lost "the last generation of immigrants from Italy, Ireland,
and Central Europe," and noting that "the vast majority of immi-
grants hold principles which the Republican Party warmly
embraces," former Education Secretary William Bennett and former
United States Representative Jack Kemp asked, "can anyone calcu-
late the political cost of again turning away immigrants this time...
Asians, Hispanics, and others?"41 Similarly, critics underscored the
economic importance of undocumented aliens. It is estimated that
there are over one million immigrants with some form of false iden-
tity documentation currently employed in California.4 Thus,
Proposition 187 turns "hundreds of thousands of our hard-working,
tax-paying, minimum-wage gardeners and nannies into prison in-
mates at a cost of tens of billions of dollars [and] hardly seems a
sensible means of solving our state's budget problems."43 Undocu-
mented aliens are also important in areas other than domestic
labor." As one Latino community activist warned, "Just imagine
what would happen to the garment industry .... It's sweat labor.
Who would take those jobs?" 45 Harry Kubo, the president of the
Nisei Farm League, estimated that "year-round, 50 percent [of
39. A Response to Anti-Immigrant Proposals, CAL. TOMORROW, Nov. 1993, at 3.
40. See Henry P. Pachon, A Flirtation with the GOP Turns Cold, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6,
1994, at MS.
41. See Pamela Burdman & Edward Epstein, Wilson Goes After Kemp and Bennett,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 20, 1994, at Al; Kemp, Bennett Talk Sense, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21, 1994,
at B5; William Buckley, Immigrant Backlash Could Hurt GOP, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
25, 1994, at B10.
42. See Ron K. Unz, Scaling the Heights of Irrationality, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at
B7.
43. Id.
44. See generally MORRIS & MAYio, supra note 6 (discussing the occupations of
undocumented aliens); J. Edward Taylor & Thomas Espenshade, Seasonality and the
Changing Role of Undocumented Immigrants in the California Farm Labor Market, in
RIVERA-BATIZ ET AL., supra note 6 (discussing the role of undocumented aliens as
farm laborers).
45. Efrain Hernandez, Point of Impact; Before It Has Even Come to a Vote, Proposition
187 Has Sent Shock Waves Through Central Los Angeles' Vast Immigrant Population and
the Institutions that Provide for It, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at 14.
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Fresno County's farm laborers] are illegals."'" Manuel Cunha, the
Farm League's Executive Director queried, "who is going to pick the
fruit in the fields?" 47 Another farmer chastised Governor Wilson for
supporting Proposition 187, stating that "the work force that's being
targeted is our work force. And we'd be crazy to come out against
our work force. 48 Many farmers simply declared that they would
ignore Proposition 187 once it passed.4
Moreover, some opponents feared that Proposition 187 would
politically and economically alienate Mexico, which is becoming an
increasingly important trading partner since the passage of the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A Mexican official
in the Foreign Minister's office commented that "it's confusing to
people that the US is building iron fences after so much talk of us
becoming partners."" Protesters in Mexico were less diplomatic.
Some urged boycotts, some protested along the United States-
Mexico border, others trashed a McDonald's, widely considered an
American symbol. 2 In light of these incidents, business persons
worried that with the passage of Proposition 187, California would
lose trade with Mexico to less hostile states like Texas or Arizona.53
Critics cited a number of ethical considerations in opposing
Proposition 187. Regarding education, opponents claimed that
Proposition 187 "[makes] kids victims because adults haven't en-
forced existing laws."' Undocumented children who came to the
United States with their parents did not come of their own volition.
In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas law restrict-
ing undocumented children from public education, in part because
46. Ed Mendel, Growers Fear Labor Shortage if Voters End Social Services, SAN DIEGO
UNION -TRiB., Oct. 17, 1994, at A3.
47. Id.; see Brandon, supra note 26, at 1.
48. Susan Ferriss, Prop. 187: A Clash of Rhetoric, Reality, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 30,
1994, at Al.
49. See id.; Bozniak, supra note 8, at 988. See generally Taylor & Espenshade, supra
note 44 (discussing studies demonstratiig that in most sectors of the economy em-
ployers enforce illegal immigration laws only when it is in their interests to do so).
50. See Louis Freedberg, Mexico Slowly Getting Tougher on Illegals, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 12, 1994, at Al; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296.
51. Howard LaFranchi, Proposal Against Illegals in California Irks Mexicans,
CHRISrIAN Sci. MONITOR, Nov. 3, 1994, at 3.
52. See Patrick Lee, Prop. 187 Threatens to Disrupt Ties with Mexico, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1994, at Dl; McDonald's in Mexico City Vandalized by Prop. 187 Foes, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at A26.
53. See Lee, supra note 52, at Dl.
54. Susan Ferriss, Immigrant Ballot Issue Imperils Kids, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 9, 1994,
at Cl.
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"[it] imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal charac-
teristic over which children can have little control. 55
Critics commented that the enforcement of Proposition 187
might lead to discrimination against citizens, particularly people of
color, and thereby cause an increase in racial tensions among Ameri-
cans. Proposition 187 orders public officials to report those
"reasonably suspected" of being undocumented to the INS, and
"because 'reasonably suspect' is not defined, anyone who is foreign
looking and speaks with an accent could be affected. 56 William
Bennett and Jack Kemp argued that "[Proposition 187] is also a
mandate for ethnic discrimination. Does anyone seriously doubt that
Latino children named Rodriguez would be more likely to 'appear'
to be illegal than Anglo children named, say, Jones?"' Latino com-
mentators charged that "the racism underlying the measure targets
Latinos," that Proposition 187 was "a direct attack on everyone of
Latino heritage," and that this was especially dangerous in a society
"already racially divided."58 Prominent African American figures
warned that Proposition 187 threatened to "Balkaniz[e] . . .the al-
ready polarized arena of racial politics."s9
Opponents of Proposition 187 also claimed that the law re-
quired citizens to act as law enforcement officials, and thus
engendered "Big Brotherism run amok."60 Attorney General Janet
Reno complained that "[ilt does not make sense to turn schoolteach-
ers and nurses into Border Patrol agents., 6' For people of color, such
55. 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
56. Leslie Berestein, Asian Groups Unite to Educate Residents on Impact of Prop. 187,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at 3. The Asian American community has therefore, re-
sponded to Proposition 187 with concern and organized opposition to the measure.
See Pamela Burdman, A Push to Get Immigrants to Vote, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1994, at
A3; Samuel Cacas, Prop. 187 Continues Stirring the Senses, ASIAN WK., Oct. 21, 1994, at
3; Connie Kang, Asian American Groups Organize to Fight Measure, KOREA TIMES, Nov.
2, 1994, at 1; Milton Marks, The Posing Dangers of Proposition 187, ASIAN WK., Oct. 21,
1994, at 1; Tina Nguyen, Chinatown; Coalition of Groups Denounce Prop. 187, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at 3.
57. Pamela Burdman & Edward Epstein, Wilson Goes After Kemp and Bennett, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 20, 1994, at 1; see Edward Epstein, Brown Quotes Wilson Against Wilson
on Immigration Issue, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 26, 1994, at A8 (noting that when Wilson was
Mayor of San Diego he opposed employer sanctions for hiring illegal immigrants on
the theory that the sanctions "would very likely produce the kind of discrimination
that a number of minority groups, civil rights groups, are concerned about").
58. See Doyle & Olivo, supra note 23, at B2; Antonio Rodriguez & Carlos Chavez,
Latinos Unite in Self-Defense on Prop. 187, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1994, at B7.
59. Joe R. Flicks & Constance L. Rice, Pioneers of the Civil Rights Movement Would
Find Common Cause with Latinos in Today's California, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1994, at B7;
see Punishing Immigrants, supra note 26, at 18 (noting that Proposition 187 has an
"unmistakable undertone of bigotry" and would aggravate racial tensions).
60. McDonnell, supra note 8, at A12.
61. Louis Freedberg, Reno Blasts Prop. 187-Questions Legality, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
28, 1994, at A4.
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discretion appeared especially prone to abuse: "[Olne does not need
a crystal ball to see how distinctions would be made.... The power
to determine who is suspect is put in the hands of any person at a
school or health facility., 62 For these reasons, many pledged not to
comply with the reporting requirements; even some supporters said
they would not report people suspected of being illegal.63 Local po-
lice organizations hinted that they would not comply because
"police departments around the country ...recognized that un-
documented immigrants often [would] fail to report criminal
activity to the police and refuse to serve as witnesses for fear of
coming to the attention of the INS."" Physicians' and teachers'
groups insisted that they too "would not be used as agents for the
INS."65
Despite these arguments, Proposition 187 passed." In exit polls
voters cited illegal immigration as the most important issue in that
election. "Proposition 187 ... polarized the electorate along racial
lines, winning big among white voters while losing in every other
ethnic group. 6 7 Having won the race for re-election, Governor
Wilson wrote a letter to President Clinton asking for his "full
cooperation and assistance" in implementing the initiative, and
Republicans in Washington, D.C. announced plans for a federal bill
to eliminate benefits to all non-citizens, including legal residents.6
Republicans noted that although Latinos in California rejected
Proposition 187 as a group, twenty-two percent of Latinos still
supported it, as did almost half of all Asian American and African
American voters.69 Indeed, the issue not only divided Californians
along racial lines, it also divided people of color against themselves.
The remainder of this Note attempts to explain these developments
by providing an account of contemporary United States rights
discourse.
62. John W. Mack, Is Black-Latino Friction a Voting Booth Issue? No, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1994, at B5.
63. See Doreen Carvajal, Prop. 187 Has Even Backers a Bit Uneasy, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
31, 1994, at Al.
64. Bozniak, supra note 8, at 1003; see also David Ferrell & Robert Lopez, State
Waits to See What Prop. 187 Will Really Mean, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994 at Al (quoting
an LAPD officer stating "It's not our job to ask people where they are from.... We
aren't the INS. We have more important things to do.").
65. Burdman, supra note 37, at A2; Pamela Burdman, Opposition to Prop. 187 Is
Growing, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18, 1994, at C16.
66. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 1, at Al.
67. Id.
68. See Paul Feldman, Wilson Acts to Enforce Parts of Prop. 187, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 1994, at Al; Elizabeth Shogren, Plans to Cut Safety Net Leave Legal Immigrants
Dangling, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1994, at Al.
69. See Weintraub, supra note 1, at Al.
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II. TRIUMPH OF CIVIL RIGHTS DISCOURSE
A. Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement
For many Americans, especially African Americans, the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1960s marked a major turning point in
American history. Inextricably a part of the United States, African
Americans vied for full membership in American society through
the Civil Rights Movement. In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
wrote:
Abused and scorned though we may be, our destiny is tied
up with the destiny of America.... For more than two cen-
turies our foreparents labored in this country without
wages; they made cotton king; and they built the homes of
their masters in the midst of brutal injustice and shameful
humiliation-and yet out of a bottomless vitality they con-
tinued to thrive and develop. If the inexpressible cruelties
of slavery could not stop us, the opposition we now face
will surely fail. We will win our freedom because the sa-
cred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God are
embodied in our echoing demands.7
Although their claims were sometimes phrased as general
claims of human beings seeking dignity, many African Americans
strengthened their demands during the Civil Rights Movement
largely by emphasizing that they were Americans seeking justice un-
der American law.7' African Americans struggled for fundamental
rights denied them since the birth of this nation. In his "I Have a
Dream" speech, Dr. King said:
When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent
words of the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence, they were signing a promissory note to
which every American was to fall heir. This note was the
promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men,
would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.72
70. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, reprinted in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 301 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
71. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR. RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 7 (2d ed. 1980).
72. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I Have a Dream, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE, supra note 70, at 217 (emphasis added).
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At one of the high points of the Movement, Dr. King phrased
the struggle as one where American citizens were making legitimate
claims for a fulfillment of American promises: "[We]'ve come to ...
cash [this] check."7
Subsequently, leading commentators on the Civil Rights
Movement interpret it as one where African Americans demanded
their civil rights and their fair share of this nation's resources based
on their historic link and service to this country. Professor Derrick
Bell writes:
[Almericans, black and white, view the civil rights crusade
as a long, slow, but always upward pull that must, given
the basic precepts of this country and the commitment of
its people to equality and liberty, eventually end in the full
enjoyment by blacks of all rights and privileges of citizenship
enjoyed by whites.74
Professor Kenneth Karst argues that the Civil Rights Movement
was essentially about "equal citizenship for all Americans," and that
the transformations that the Movement engendered were more than
legal:
Ultimately, equal citizenship would have to find a founda-
tion in the sense of whites and blacks that they were part of
the same community.... Segregation would not end with
the elimination of segregation laws; it would end when
blacks and whites came to think nothing of sitting side by
side at lunch counters, on buses, and in theaters.75
For Karst, those who participated in that struggle deserve credit for
"formally re-defining our national community.
'§I
In light of American constitutional history, it is not surprising
that the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement phrased their claims
as citizens. Although there have been instances where the Supreme
Court offered constitutional protections to persons "outside" the
national community or extended some human rights guarantees to
nonresident aliens, it has reserved most protections for citizens,
often treating the Constitution as though it was applicable
exclusively to United States citizens.7 Over the course of a century
73. Id.
74. BELL, supra note 71, at 7 (emphasis added).
75. KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 74 (1989).
76. See id. at 80.
77. See, e.g., Wong v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (extending unanimously
Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process protections to illegal aliens facing
deportation; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (unanimously ruling that
"[t]he Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution is not confined to the protection of
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the boundaries of citizenship have changed to include ever more
categories of persons: freed male slaves, then women, then Asians,
all once considered "aliens ineligible for citizenship."78 Perhaps
because many of these dramatic changes have been effected through
constitutional means, the Supreme Court demonstrated a recent
reluctance to extend constitutional protections to those not legal
citizens. 9 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,80 the Court held that
Fourth Amendment protections only extended to those people who
have "substantial connections" with the United States.8' Justice
Rehnquist, relying heavily on social contract theory, suggested that
because undocumented aliens in particular were not privy to the
contract between citizens and the United States government
embodied in the Constitution, they were not entitled to the
protections of that Constitution.82
Given this background, people of color have understandably
availed themselves of a civil rights discourse to articulate claims for
justice, marking their position as members of the national commu-
nity rather than as outsiders to that community. For example, when
Japanese Americans sought redress, they spoke the language of civil
rights. The injury to this group of Americans occurred during World
War II, when an estimated 120,000 Japanese Americans in California,
Washington, and Oregon were sent to internment camps on the
grounds of "military necessity."8 In 1988, the Japanese Americans
sent to the camps won a victory based primarily on the argument
that the United States government questioned Japanese American
loyalty, then unfairly imprisoned them in squalid camps, thereby
depriving them of their constitutional rights. In August of 1988,
when President Ronald Reagan signed a bill that provided a mone-
tary payment to each survivor of the camps, he admitted that the
government had committed a wrong against its own people who
had remained "utterly loyal" to the United States." President Reagan
underscored the devotion of Japanese Americans to America-the
bravery of Japanese American troops in Europe, their status back
citizens," but is to be applied "to all persons within the territorial jurisdictions
without regard to any difference of race, or color, or nationality"). See generally
Gerald Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) (discussing
applicability of the protections of the Constitution to non-citizens).
78. See Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
79. See Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocu-
mented Immigrants' Rights After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999, 1002-03 (1992) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 258,271 (1990)).
80. 494 U.S. 258 (1990).
81. See id. at 265-66.
82. Id.
83. See RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 379 (1989).
84. See id. at 485.
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home as Americans, and their exemplary behavior in the camps de-
spite the injustice of American law. Japanese Americans won
redress, not on the grounds that the United States government vio-
lated their rights as human beings, but rather on the grounds that
the government violated the civil rights of American citizens. This
achievement of Japanese Americans was taken not as a victory for
human rights, but rather as a victory for "[e]qual citizenship for cul-
tural minorities."'
Even those who acknowledge the limits of the civil rights
discourse nonetheless affirm the usefulness of its public rhetoric: its
core bid for equal citizenship and inclusion phrased in the language
of rights. Although Professor Kimberl Williams Crenshaw claimed
that "antidiscrimination discourse is fundamentally ambiguous," she
affirmed its persuasive influence in contemporary politics.
Crenshaw commented:
One wonders . .. whether a demand for shelter that does
not employ rights rhetoric is likely to succeed in America
today.... Rights are a way of saying that a society is what
it is, or that it ought to live up to its deepest commitments.
This is essentially what all groups of dispossessed people
say when they use rights rhetoric.
Professor Crenshaw suggested that in order to be mindful of
what works in American politics, advocates must rely on rights dis-
course as an effective way "to extract from others that which others
are not predisposed to give."'' Furthermore, although speaking the
language of rights might well be "an inevitably co-optive process," it
may also be one of the only effective means that advocates have-
"[tihe struggle of Blacks... is a struggle for inclusion, [it] is a strug-
gle to create a new status quo through the ideological and political
tools that are available."'8 9
In the United States, rights discourse has been described as a
tool invested with elements of magic. In much of her work, Professor
Patricia J. Williams recognizes the "spell" of rights and criticizes
those who see only its limits.
"Rights" feels so deliciously new in the mouths of most
black people. It is still so deliciously empowering to say. It
is the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion
85. Id at 484-86.
86. KARST, supra note 75, at 92.
87. KimberM Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1335 (1988).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1386.
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and exclusion, of power and no-power. The concept of
rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of our citi-
zenship, our participatoriness, our relation to others.90
Critical Legal Studies may deconstruct rights discourse to re-
veal nothing in its foundations, but for people who seek racial
justice, "this failure of rights discourse.., does not necessarily mean
that informal systems will lead to better outcomes."9' Williams ar-
gues that rather than discard civil rights discourse and all its magic,
advocates might recognize that "the mask [has] to be donned by the
acquiring Shaman, and put to good ends. 92 For Professor Williams,
the mask has been, and continues to be, a powerful force in the lives
of citizens claiming their place as full members of this civil society.
Within this backdrop, it is not clear where undocumented ali-
ens should "fit." Ever since the Civil Rights Movement, advocates
for change relied on the language of rights to rearrange relationships
among citizens and to make this nation presumably more inclusive.9
Under a certain understanding of the Constitution and the scope of
its protections, they claimed for themselves membership in the na-
tional community. Subsequently, African Americans, Latinos, and
Asian Americans employed the language of rights with some suc-
cess. One of the most disturbing aspects of the most recent debate in
California was that for undocumented aliens-those who have no
"legal" standing, no citizenship or formal membership-the language
of civil rights appeared to pose only a threat, with no "magic." The
discussion concerning undocumented aliens in California proceeded
as though undocumented aliens had no right to speak, no right to
privacy, and no legitimate "entitlements" to public assistance. Citi-
zens spoke of such "rights" as if they belonged only to them. In
addition citizens, including people of color, conspired to treat un-
documented aliens as if they were literally "illegal," outside the pale
of American law, and therefore rightless.
B. Rightless Status of Undocumented Aliens
One of the most striking features of the debate around Proposi-
tion 187 was the almost total absence of undocumented aliens who
spoke for themselves. Undocumented aliens did not write editorials
or appear in public, either in support of or in opposition to the
90. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 431 (1987) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 423.
92. Id. at 431-32.
93. See KARST, supra note 75, at 147 (discussing the Civil Rights Movement's
emphasis on racial neutrality).
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measure. If they spoke at all, they usually remained anonymous,
nameless, and untraceable. Moreover, there were no organizations
that represented undocumented aliens directly. Although some or-
ganizations purported to speak for them, no organization spoke as
them. Because their mere presence "by definition is breaking the
law,, 94 revealing any presence was an occasion for detention, or
eventually, deportation. Thus, undocumented aliens were, in this
discussion and in society generally, without a right to speak, with-
out a right to assemble. Unlike those formally accused of
wrongdoing, undocumented aliens do not so much "have a right to
remain silent";9 rather they must remain silent in order to remain at
all. Ironically, "the more visible [undocumented aliens] became, the
more difficult it [was] to beat [Proposition 187]. "96
Undocumented aliens also had no right to privacy. The details
of Proposition 187 make this clear. The measure requires local agen-
cies to report undocumented aliens however they are discovered.
Under Proposition 187, local agencies must report any information
that could reveal illegal status, regardless of whether such informa-
tion directly pertained to immigration. On its face, Proposition 187
violates both the syirit and letter of the Family Educational Records
and Privacy Act. But rather than claim that Proposition 187 in-
fringed upon the privacy rights of undocumented aliens, opponents
focused on how Proposition 187 would violate the privacy of citi-
zens. In the enforcement of Proposition 187 and similar laws "[a]
police-state mentality will be created in which everyone carries citi-
zenship papers and anyone who can't prove his or her citizen status
is in jeopardy of being reported." 9' One voter remarked "I would be
extremely offended to have to give proof of my legal residence in
this country"; another stated, "It's an unnecessary invasion of our
personal privacy." Although Proposition 187 explicitly denies pri-
vacy rights to the undocumented, opponents spoke as if only
citizens had such rights anyway, stating that Proposition 187 would
primarily entail "invasions" of citizens' privacy. If undocumented
94. Connell, supra note 14, at Al.
95. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965) (delineating the right to remain
silent in interactions with police officers).
96. McDonnell & Lopez, supra note 25, at B1.
97. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232(g) (West 1996) (stating that "[n]o funds shall be made
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution
which has a practice of permitting the release of education records (or personally
identifiable information other than directory information) of students without the
written consent of their parents to any individual agency or organization, other than
to (education officials or the US Comptroller General)"); see Freedberg, supra note 34,
at Al.
98. Hayward, supra note 19, at Al (emphasis added).
99. Kenneth J. Garcia, Wilson's ID Card Idea Draws Scorn, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 28,
1994, at A4.
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aliens had rights to privacy, opponents of Proposition 187 were
oblivious to this fact.
Proponents and opponents alike spoke of access to health care
and public education as claims "to society's resources," not as rights-
based claims. Proponents took advantage of the fact that in this de-
mocracy, public education and health care may or may not be rights
to which all persons are entitled) ° In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme
Court did not defend the "rights" of undocumented children to re-
ceive a public education.' Rather, the Court described education as
being more important than "merely some governmental 'benefit.' ,,102
The Supreme Court has been contradictory in this realm. In Brown v.
Board of Education, where the Court confronted access to public edu-
cation for African American children, the Court stated that "such an
opportunity [as public education], where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be available to all on equal terms."'0 3
But in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Court
upheld the notion that education is not a fundamental right deserv-
ing equal protection. 4
If education was a "right" in 1954 for American citizens, it
clearly was not a "right" for undocumented children in 1982. Indeed,
following Plyler, if a state like California could prove "some sub-
stantial state interest" in denying California's undocumented aliens
a public education, the Court would presumably hold such denial
constitutional. Because undocumented children can make no rights
claims under Plyler, their "interests" could well be sacrificed to the
interests of a state or its citizens.
100. Note that scholars still debate whether health care rights, education rights, or
subsistence rights should be considered as fundamental as the right to speak or the
right to privacy. See generally HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE
AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980). The Supreme Court has been reluctant to view
government benefits as "rights" to which citizens are entitled, and yet the Court often
treats entitlements as rights. Compare, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969)
(treating welfare entitlements like property rights protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), with DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489
U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that a social services department specifically set up to pro-
tect children may not be held liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for harm to a
child, even though it knew that the child was in danger of harm; in effect, the child
had no "right" to protection under a state program charged with protecting chil-
dren).
101. See 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see also Marianne Constable, Sovereignty and Govern-
mentality in Modern American Immigration Law, 13 STUD. L., POL., & SoC'Y 249, 261
(1993).
102. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
103. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
104. 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (stating that, although educa-
tion is not "merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms




Opponents of Proposition 187 predicted civil strife in the wake
of its passage. Because the enforcement of Proposition 187 would
mean reporting those "suspected" of being undocumented, oppo-
nents stressed the spill-over effects of the law to people of color. A
Korean American newspaper editorial stated, "Prop. 187 will lead to
discrimination against Asian Pacific Americans and other groups
who look or sound foreign."'0 5 Two African American commentators
wrote that Proposition 187 would "subject Latinos and Asians-but
not Europeans-to suspicion and stigmas."' 6 These commentators
suggested that opponents of Proposition 187 emphasized the poten-
tial discrimination that citizens might suffer, primarily because
distinguishing between "real" undocumented aliens and those who
only look like undocumented aliens is not an easy task. Opponents
argued that "[t]he most dangerous and racist implications of Propo-
sition 187 are that all Latinos will be targets and considered suspects
just because of how they look. [Moreover], [iut doesn't outline care-
fully how a person will be identified.'0 7 The arguments concerning
health care were no different. One editorial spoke of how "illegal
immigrants with diseases such as tuberculosis and AIDS, even
chicken pox and smallpox, would not qualify for medical treatment,
endangering every California resident by subjecting them to a new
wave of communicable diseases."'0 8
Although opponents of Proposition 187 expressed concern that
the measure would inflame racial tensions among citizens, lead to
discrimination against Latinos, or cause an increase in disease
among citizens, they remained silent about the discrimination, os-
tracism, and sickness undocumented aliens would endure if
Proposition 187 was enacted. They opposed Proposition 187 not on
the grounds that it would violate the "rights" of undocumented ali-
ens, engender discrimination against them, or make them more
vulnerable to disease. Rather, they spoke as though such matters
were irrelevant issues, or at least not as relevant as the constitutional
rights of citizens of color, the discrimination that citizens faced, or the
awful diseases that citizens could contract. 1°9
105. Asian Pacific Americans Opposed to Proposition 187, KOREA TIMES, Sept. 7, 1994,
at5.
106. Hicks & Rice, supra note 59, at B7.
107. Doyle & Olivo, supra note 23, at B2.
108. SOS Initiative-Costly, Mean and Wrong, supra note 26, at Sunday Punch 1.
109. See Paul Feldman & Rich Connell, Wilson Acts to Enforce Parts of Prop. 187,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al (noting that after enactment of Proposition 187,
Governor Wilson responded to these concerns by ordering that all precautions be
taken "to deal with any threat of communicable disease, whether through immuni-
zation or quarantine or other measures," and also ordering state agencies to protect
"the rights of all legal residents" and to ensure that "the provisions of Proposition
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Strangely, in the context of Proposition 187 and immigration
law generally, the only way for undocumented aliens to be treated
like legal residents would be through commitment of a crime. For
example, undocumented aliens who were imprisoned would receive
preventative medical care: "Even the worst thugs housed in our
prisons get vaccinations."" ° Throughout the criminal justice system,
undocumented aliens would have the same rights as legal residents
who had committed similar crimes."' Undocumented aliens could
also acquire legal rights if they remained undetected--"outside the
pale of law"-long enough to become eligible for naturalization. In
1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) ordered the
INS to legalize "eligible undocumented aliens"--those who resided
in this country for five or more years."2 Between 1987 and 1989,
some 1.7 million people (960,000 of whom were from California)
applied for legal status."' What is odd about the IRCA's legalization
provisions is that they seem to "reward law-breaking"; the undocu-
mented aliens who are eligible for legalization are, after all, those
most successful in evading immigration laws." 4 "The entire hierar-
chy of values which is present in civilized countries was reversed"
for undocumented aliens-those who broke the immigration laws or
could manage to avoid the effects of such laws for longer periods
had the best chance of eventually enjoying the protection of natu-
ralization."5
If opponents of Proposition 187 ever admitted that law-abiding,
undocumented aliens have rights, they did so only in the context of
discussing how the undocumented could become potential citizens.
William Bennett and Jack Kemp emphasized that undocumented
aliens could be an important group of potential voters;" 6 Howard
Chang discussed ways in which immigrant children could be
187 [be] implemented in a manner that avoids discrimination on the basis of national
origin").
110. Brian O'Leary Bennett, An Initiative Even Conservatives Can Hate, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1994, at B7.
111. See Developments in the Law--Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, supra
note 30; see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 286 (1951)
(stating that "[s]ince [the stateless person] was an anomaly for whom the general law
did not provide, it was better for him to become an anomaly for which it did pro-
vide, that of the criminal.... The best criterion by which to decide whether someone
has been forced outside the pale of the law is to ask if he would benefit by commit-
ting a crime.").
112. See Michael Hoefer, Background of U.S. Immigration Policy Reform, in RIVERA-
BATIZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 30-31; SUSAN GONZALEz BAKER, THE CAUTIOUS
WELCOME (1990).
113. See Hoefer, supra note 112, at 30-31.
114. See BAKER, supra note 112, at 16.
115. See ARENDT, supra note 111, at 286.
116. See Burdman & Epstein, supra note 57, at Al.
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integrated into our society and our work force as future citizens." 7
But for the purposes of Proposition 187, non-criminal
undocumented aliens apparently had no rights worth mentioning.
Only citizens "could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions,"
and unless undocumented aliens were somehow "completely
assimilated and divorced from their origins," they had neither rights
claims nor claims to society's resources."' Citizens spoke as though
undocumented aliens, having no substantial connection to this
nation and without a legitimate place in American society, were
owed nothing, not even the most minimal provisions."9 In the face of
being considered "rightless persons," undocumented aliens
confronted a perilous fate.
C. Managing Human Resources
Although proponents and opponents both spoke as if undocu-
mented aliens had no rights in society-at least not as
undocumented aliens-they did not agree about what to do with
undocumented aliens. There were several options: do nothing; engi-
neer a mass deportation or voluntary out-migration of illegals;
eliminate social services and other "costs" associated with having
illegals within the state's borders; or assimilate undocumented ali-
ens into American society. In choosing among these options,
undocumented aliens had no right to speak, no right to an educa-
tion, no right to privacy, and no right to any social resources. If a
"right is something that can be demanded or insisted upon without
embarrassment or shame," undocumented aliens had none that
commanded the attention of citizens. 20 Perhaps because they were
treated as though they had no rights, Proposition 187's proponents
and opponents alike often discussed undocumented aliens as re-
sources to be managed. Aliens were either to be expelled because
they were useless, retained because they were useful, or improved
because they could be useful. The debate around Proposition 187
became, in many respects, a discussion among citizens about the pre-
sent and future utility of undocumented aliens to citizens.
Some proponents of Proposition 187 claimed that undocu-
mented aliens were a net drain on society. Undocumented aliens
were hired while "[pleople who were born here can't find jobs.''.
Ron Prince, Chairman of Save Our State, argued "[p]resently we are
117. See Chang, supra note 36, at B5.
118. See ARENDT, supra note 111, at 286.
119. See Romero, supra note 79, at 1002-03.
120. SHUE, supra note 100, at 15.
121. Immigration a Tough Call for Blacks, supra note 11, at Al.
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denigrating the quality of services" because of undocumented ali-
ens.9 Harold Ezell, a co-author of Proposition 187 and former
commissioner of the INS, asked, "How many illegals can we edu-
cate, medicate, compensate, and incarcerate before California goes
bankrupt?"'" Some proponents were more blunt. One voter wrote:
"For the past couple of decades, people have been pouring into this
nation . . . to have their babies and overpopulate and overburden
our state and federal services. We really need Proposition 187 to stop
the flaunting of our laws and overburdening of our systems."1 24 Still
another voter said that undocumented aliens "contributed nothing"
to society.'9 Because undocumented aliens were useless, even harm-
ful, to legal residents, they needed to be expelled, or at least
excluded from social services, as was the intent of Proposition 187.
After passage of Proposition 187 Governor Wilson moved quickly to
begin implementation of the measure by issuing an executive order
to discontinue public benefits to undocumented aliens.
126
Some Californians, however, preferred the present system. A
Korean American businessman urged other Korean Americans to
remember that Korean businesses-from sweat shops to supermar-
kets-relied heavily on undocumented aliens for cheap labor. 27
Former GOP gubernatorial candidate Ron Unz championed their
skills as gardeners and nannies. 128 Both California candidates for the
United States Senate employed at least one undocumented alien as a
housekeeper or child care provider.'29 Arianna Huffington, the wife
of United States Senate candidate Michael Huffington, praised the
qualities of her undocumented nanny, commenting: "She was a
magical Mary Poppins, and I feel the children have been privileged
to know her.... It's not easy to find someone who loves your chil-
dren. You can find people to take care of them, but not to love
them.' 30 Undocumented aliens also picked fruit and vegetables so
well that even Governor Pete Wilson himself once thought them an
indispensable asset. When Wilson was a United States Senator in
1986, during the passage of the IRCA, he said: "I deplore the
122. Hernandez, supra note 45, at 14.
123. Harold Ezell, Enough Is More than Enough: We Can't Afford Illegal Immigration,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, at M5.
124. A Panoply of Emotions over Proposition 187, S.D. UNION-TRB., Oct. 22, 1994, at 7.
125. See id.
126. See Feldman, supra note 109, at Al.
127. See Newshour (Korean Broadcasting Service news broadcast, Oct. 28, 1994).
128. John Jacobs, For Huddled Masses Yearning to Be Free, Prop. 187?, S.F. EX-
AMINER, Oct. 31,1994, at A21.
129. See Susan Yoachum, Huffington Hired Illegal Immigrant, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 27,
1994, at Al; INS Says Feinstein Maid Illegal, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1994, at C3.
130. John Wildermuth, Mrs. Huffington Talks About Secret Nanny, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 1, 1994, at Al.
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[Immigration and Naturalization Service] raids on farms in
[California] in the roundup of illegal aliens. Our economy needs
such workers."'3 Although Wilson changed his mind, many farmers
did not. Asian American farm groups silently opposed the measure.
One Asian American farmer said, "Let's hope 187 is tied up in the
courts for a long time, because if they stop [undocumented aliens]
from coming over, you can kiss this valley good-bye.' 32 Although
most employers of farm workers formally remained neutral on
Proposition 187, many did so because they believed the law was ir-
relevant or unenforceable. 3 3 "Agricultural employers are inclined to
follow [immigration laws], but not if it means losing their crops."''
To William Bennett, Jack Kemp, and William Buckley, un-
documented aliens could become tremendous assets to the
Republican Party. Opponents of Proposition 187 spoke against the
measure because it would alienate, eliminate, degrade, or under-
develop the political asset of undocumented aliens.3 s Latinos
quickly underscored an argument that Republican support of
Proposition 187 would hurt the GOP: "Throughout the next decade,
well over 1 million new Latino voters will enter the California elec-
torate. . . . Political memories are long lasting in ethnic commu-
nities.' 36 Latinos reminded Republicans that undocumented aliens
were a type of resource, a potential threat or potential asset to the
GOP.
Similarly, leaving undocumented aliens without social services
or public education would hurt citizens and undocumented aliens
alike. Both proponents and opponents of Proposition 187 worried
that undocumented aliens would "imperil the health of
Californians.' 37 Undocumented children would "learn the lessons of
the streets-gangbanging, violence, and crime.' 38 By failing to
educate these children, legal residents would miss an opportunity:
"High rates of illiteracy in English will prevent their full
participation in the community and fuller participation in the work
force . Additionally, "Education provides the basic tools by which
individuals might lead socially productive lives to the benefit of us
131. James Bomemeier, Charting Wilson's Transformation on Immigration, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at A3.
132. Ferrell & Lopez, supra note 64, at Al.
133. See id.
134. Bozniak, supra note 8, at 992.
135. See Burdman & Epstein, supra note 57, at 1.
136. Henry Pachon, A Flirtation With the GOP Turns Cold, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994,
at M5.
137. See SOS Initiative-Costly, Mean and Wrong, supra note 26, at Sunday Punch 1.
138. Mack, supra note 62, at B5.
139. A Response to Anti-Immigrant Proposals, supra note 39, at 3.
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all. "' 40 By keeping undocumented aliens healthy and educated,
society could make them more productive units of labor.
Proposition 187 represented, in this way, a deliberate squandering of
potential resources, the loss of opportunities.
Other opponents-some farmers, business owners, and sena-
tors-did not seem to care much for improvements in the
population of undocumented aliens. They feared simply that un-
documented immigrants would be unavailable to work, to cut grass,
and to love their children.4
Even as citizens talked of ways to use undocumented aliens,
they themselves insisted on not being used. Teachers and physi-
cians, even policemen, did not want to be used as INS agents.42
Fearful of losing federal money, citizens did not want to be used as
political hostages if Proposition 187 passed. Some taxpayers did not
want their money used to pay for undocumented aliens, and so they
supported Proposition 187.'43 Others did not want their money used
to pay for a sicker, more criminal undocumented alien population if
Proposition 187 passed, so they opposed it.'" No one who spoke in
this debate wanted to be used in the same way undocumented aliens
were.
Unable to defend the "rights" of undocumented aliens, citizens
debated the aliens' usefulness. Proponents of Proposition 187 often
denied that undocumented aliens had any positive value to soci-
ety-saying that undocumented aliens were about as valuable to
society as a plague. Opponents countered that under the provisions
of Proposition 187, undocumented aliens would become just that
harmful. Either way, a major part of the debate around Proposition
187 concerned the questions of the net costs of undocumented aliens
to society and the best way to eliminate or to reduce such costs. Both
sides treated undocumented aliens not as "ends in themselves," as
persons with rights, with an intrinsic "worth" independent of their
usefulness in a market economy, but rather as the ultimate "human
resource," to be expelled, retained, or improved, depending upon
how the community of citizens-including citizens of color-felt
about their present or future "utility.' 4' The question of undocu-
mented aliens, as it arose in the debate around Proposition 187, was
140. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,216 (1982) (emphasis added).
141. See Unz, supra note 42, at B7; Wildermuth, supra note 130, at Al.
142. See Gail D. Cox, Calif Law on Aliens Spurs Disobedience, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12,
1994, at A6.
143. See Hernandez, supra note 45, at 14.
144. See 187: It's a Risky Proposition; Hazards of Immigration Measure Dwarf Potential
Benefits, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1994, at B18.
145. See generally THE MORAL LAW: KANT'S GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS ch. II (H.J. Paton trans., Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1967).
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to a large extent a question of how best to manage human resources.
In a way, the use of a civil rights discourse implicitly entailed the
utter disregard of those who were not de jure members of civil soci-
ety.
III. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY, LIBERALISM,
AND RIGHTS TALK
The debate about Proposition 187 exposed the major weak-
nesses of a civil rights discourse. Perhaps accustomed to speaking of
a language of civil rights, participants in the debate either forgot
about, or could not account for, the dignity or worth of undocu-
mented aliens. Rather than treating them as persons worthy of
respect-and rights-citizens assumed that without citizenship, un-
documented aliens had no legitimate rights-based claims in society.
If undocumented aliens had worth it was only because they could
become future citizens. Their status was the status of things or re-
sources, not persons. In the wake of Proposition 187, those who use
rights discourse should reevaluate its political impact, and move
away from a language of rights that emphasizes civil rights. Rights
discourse has not always proceeded as though rights were linked to
sovereignty.
In many ways, rights discourse emerged to protect persons from
sovereignty. Since the Enlightenment, European and American legal
systems have relied heavily on a conception of individual rights to
protect citizens from the state and from one another.146 Historically,
however, the most prevalent view of rights-at least in the United
States and Western Europe-was that a person had rights simply by
virtue of being a human being: "[Men] are endowed by their Creator
with certain inalienable Rights.' 47 Moreover, "the Rights of Man...
had been defined as 'inalienable' because they were supposed to be
independent of all governments";' "[glovernments are instituted
among men . . . to secure these rights," not to create any new
"inalienable" rights.'" The movement from a state of nature to civil
society was understood as a movement toward "settled standing
rules, indifferent and the same to all parties," rules that accorded
with the laws of nature.'" In much of classic social contract theory,
146. See JEREMY WALDRON, Liberal Rights: Two Sides of the Coin, in LIBERAL RIGHTS
COLLECTED PAPERS 1-35 (1993).
147. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
148. Id.
149. ARENDT, supra note 111, at 291-92.
150. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 163 (Thomas Cook ed., 1947).
But see THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XVIII (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1991)
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natural rights come prior to rights under sovereignty, and sover-
eignty that is destructive of persons' natural rights is a sovereignty
that has no right to exist: "it is the Right of the people to alter or
abolish it."''
The social contract theory espoused by Locke, or that imbedded
in Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, is one that treats sover-
eignty as a mechanism to protect natural rights, not as a vehicle for
the creation of new rights. If, as Locke maintained, civil society is not
permitted to deny its own citizens the rights which are naturally
theirs, it must follow that the same civil society may not deny the
natural rights of those who, for whatever reason, do not legally be-
long to it. No sovereign should infringe upon the natural rights of
any person, regardless of her legal status.
Following social contract theory, liberal political theory-
especially in the work of Immanuel Kant-also drew an image of the
person as having an intrinsic "worth," worthy of respect by virtue of
being a human agent, not by virtue of being a member of a particular
political community. Kant claimed that "rational nature exists as an
end in itself," and that as rational beings, persons ought to be treated
as ends in themselves. The form of his categorical imperative im-
plied a strong commitment to the special dignity of persons: "Act in
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but
always at the same time as an end.' ' 2 According to Kant, persons are
not to be treated as "things-something to be used merely as a
means"-that have a "market price."'5 3
Kant notes that where one is born "is no deed of him who is
born."'5 Birth within a territory is arbitrary, and the intrinsic worth
of a person should not be diminished by a circumstance over which
he has no control. Kant also suggested that "no one had more right
than another to a particular part of the earth."'55 As persons, we
share the earth in common. Kant argued that as the world grew
smaller, as the distance between nations diminished, the arbitrary
aspects of national citizenship ought to disappear:
(discussing a competing view of sovereignty, in which sovereignty is understood as
absolute).
151. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776); see LOCKE, supra
note 150, at 186-87.
152. THE MORAL LAW, supra note 145, at 91.
153. Id. at 91-92, 96.
154. IMMANUEL KANT, Theory and Practice, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT
418 (Carl Friedrich ed., 1949); see generally R. George Wright, Federal Immigration Law
and the Case for Open Entry, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1265, 1294 (1994) (discussing the
moral arbitrariness of immigration law).
155. IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace, in IMMANUEL KANT: PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS 284 (Ernst Behler & Rene Wellek eds., 1986).
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[T]he human race can gradually be brought closer and
closer to a constitution establishing world citizenship....
[T]he narrower or wider community of the peoples of the
earth has developed so far that a violation of rights in one
place is felt throughout the world, [and] the idea of a law
of world citizenship is no high-flown or exaggerated no-
tion.
5 6
Kant argued that while nation states exist, even those who are
not members of a civil society nonetheless deserve hospitality. Kant
saw in this "the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy
when he arrives in the land of another.' ' 7
In contemporary political theory, John Rawls presented an ele-
gant argument about justice in society that combined strands of
social contract theory and deontological liberalism. The basic idea of
Rawls' work was that members in society might arrive at two prin-
ciples of justice to govern society through a carefully constructed
hypothetical situation, "the original position," which "corresponds
to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social con-
tract."'58 The original position is a place where parties discover
principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance: "the parties do not
know certain kinds of particular facts.... [N]o one knows his place
in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelli-
gence and strength, and the like."' 59 Persons in the original position
know "general facts about human society," but they know nothing
specifically about their physical, biological, or intellectual aspects-
or the types of persons they will be-until the "veil" is lifted, and
they find themselves in civil society9
Rawls argued that from this initial situation, parties would
choose two principles: in the first, each party would agree to the
most extensive set of liberties compatible with an equal liberty for
all; in the second, each party would agree to an unequal distribution
of social values only if such values could be acquired through offices
open to all, and only if the unequal distribution would make every-
one better off.'6' In settling on these principles, the standards which
are to govern life prospects, the parties in the original position thus
discover principles under which the few who happen to have favorable
156. Id. at 286.
157. Id. at 284.
158. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
159. Id. at 137; see also MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
132 (1982) (arguing that principles of justice are "discovered," not "chosen," by the
parties in the original position).
160. See RAWLS, supra note 158, at 137.
161. See id. at 62.
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natural characteristics are not permitted to benefit unduly from
"contingencies that are arbitrary from a moral point of view."1 62 The
image of a Rawlsian society is one where all are committed to a basic
sense of equality, where inequality is permitted only if it benefits
everyone in society. Rawls attempted to compensate for the
"arbitrariness of the world" by structuring a process through which
"persons [can] express their nature as free and equal rational beings
subject to the general conditions of human life."' Rawls stated that
"the principles of justice manifest in the basic structure of society
men's desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in
themselves."'' Rawls' hypothetical exercise of stepping behind the
veil of ignorance is intended as a way of exploring our own deeply
held convictions about justice.
Although Rawls himself did not address issues of nationality,
his basic ideas suggest that citizenship ought to be treated like any
other "morally arbitrary" characteristic in the original position. '
Like the color of one's eyes, the shape of one's body, the particular
aspects of one's intellectual or artistic traits, citizenship is something
we are born with, but hardly anything any of us "deserves." That
one child is born in Mexico, another in Korea, and another in the
United States tells us something about their nationality and their
citizenship, but from a moral point of view, these children are
equivalent-none "deserved" the citizenship that is hers, and none
can claim that she "consented" to be a citizen of the nation she oc-
cupies. It would seem rather odd from a moral or legal viewpoint to
say that one child is worth more than another simply by virtue of
her citizenship. To say such a thing would be as problematic as to
say that blue-eyed babies are worth more than brown-eyed babies,
that more intelligent babies are worth more than less intelligent ba-
bies, or that legal Americans are worth more than undocumented
Mexicans. All are worth the same, by virtue of being human persons.
All deserve respect, a sense of dignity, and protection as "persons,"
not "things," as ends in themselves, not as means for other ends. As
in social contract theory, if rights are to exist in our discourse to pro-
tect the integrity of persons, then it follows that all persons deserve
162. Id. at 511.
163. Id. at 141, 252-53.
164. Id. at 179. Rawls argued that parties in the original position would not choose
any form of utilitarianism to govern the basic structure of society because utilitarian-
ism permits net increases in utility at the expense of the liberty or equality of some
human beings. See id. at 26.
165. See Wright, supra note 154, at 1296; see also THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING
RAWLS 247 (1989) (stating that "[n]ationality is just one further deep contingency like
genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class-one more potential basis of insti-
tutional inequalities that are inescapable and present from birth").
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protection of the same fundamental rights, and rights should not be
contingent on something as morally arbitrary as citizenship.
CONCLUSION
Whether drawing from social contract theory, Kantian theory,
or the works of John Rawls, several strands of rights discourse ex-
plicitly acknowledge the arbitrary nature of citizenship. Natural
rights belong to all persons, not just persons who happen to be born
in a particular territory. This categorical imperative is a principle
applicable to all persons, not just to citizens of one's own nation
state. If California citizens could empathize with undocumented ali-
ens, it is doubtful that undocumented aliens would be treated with
the disrespect demonstrated by passage of Proposition 187. Al-
though neither social contract theory nor classical liberalism requires
nation states to commit themselves to universal human rights, they
suggest that personhood ought to be the basis for rights, not citizen-
ship. These theories imply that societies ought to be committed to
the dignity and autonomy of persons generally, not just to the dig-
nity and autonomy of their own citizens.
If the debate around Proposition 187 proved anything, it was
that the citizens of this society reified the arbitrary characteristic of
citizenship. They spoke as citizens uncommitted to a broader under-
standing of universal human rights. By structuring a debate in
which undocumented aliens had no right to speak, no right to pri-
vacy, and no rights to social resources, citizens tacitly employed a
civil rights discourse, simultaneously foreclosing the possibility of
rights independent of citizenship. Citizens reduced non-citizens to
things. People of color discussed the utility, not the intrinsic worth,
of other people of color.
The strategy among racial minorities since the Civil Rights
Movement-since the Civil War-has been to underscore their his-
toric connections to this nation, to stress formal membership as a
means of securing a sense of dignity, worth, and respect. But this
same strategy proved extremely harmful to undocumented aliens,
those who did not "fit" the theory upon which people of color
marked their progress. For those who continue to express faith in a
civil rights discourse, in its ability to unite people of color and pro-
mote their inclusion, Proposition 187 should serve as an occasion for
worry. The Constitution protects citizens more than it does non-
citizens, it always has. The Constitution outlines the basis of a spe-
cific national government, not a world system. "The distinction
between being inside and outside the borders of the United States is
not a constitutional irrelevancy. The Constitution is an artifact of an
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era of territorial nation-states, and that era is not yet over."1' The
civil rights discourse that once unified people of color under consti-
tutional principles now divides them, at the expense of people who
are at once members of society and "outlaws" within it, arguably the
most vulnerable people of color among us. Undocumented aliens are
treated as enemies, not as persons we sit next to at lunch counters,
on buses, or in theaters. Many of us want the Constitution to protect
"us," but at the same time to be largely irrelevant to "them." To
avoid such stark contradictions, advocates and scholars need to go
beyond the legacy of contemporary civil rights discourse, to remind
themselves of the intrinsic worth of persons regardless of their na-
tionality. This is by no means an impossible task. The intellectual
tools to do that work are within our grasp-they are imbedded in
our political culture, and they are embodied in the spirit, if not the
letter, of the American Constitution.
166. Neuman, supra note 77, at 979.
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